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Abstract
We use data from a randomised experiment in Uganda to examine effects of incentives
on the decision to adopt drought-tolerant maize varieties (DTMVs) and mechanisms
through which effects occur. We find that social recognition (SR) incentives to a
random subset of trained farmers – disseminating farmers (DFs) – increase knowledge
transmission from DFs to their co-villagers and change information networks of both
DFs and their neighbours. SR also increases DFs’ likelihood of adopting DTMVs.
However, the corresponding results for private material rewards are not conclusively
strong. We find no evidence that incentives for knowledge diffusion increase the
likelihood of co-villagers adopting DTMVs.
Keywords: social networks, incentives, adoption, risk-mitigating technologies,
Uganda
JEL classification: D83, D85, O33, Q16
1. Introduction
Modern agricultural technologies hold huge potential for improving productiv-
ity and reducing poverty in developing countries. However, many agricultural
technologies with demonstrated productivity gains have not been adopted as
widely as one hoped in these countries, particularly so in many sub-Saharan
African countries where the aggregate technology adoption remains strikingly
low (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2011; Rashid et al., 2013; Sheahan and
Barrett, 2014). Substantial efforts and investments have been made to promote
the adoption and diffusion of improved agricultural technologies. The role of
disseminating farmers (DFs) as ‘injection points’ for new technologies in this
process has long been emphasised (Lukuyu et al., 2012a; Kiptot and Franzel,
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2015). Trainings and demonstrations about new agricultural technologies target
these DFs with the expectation that they will disseminate the new information
to their co-villagers (Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Kondylis, Mueller and Zhu,
2017). The DFs’ approach is championed for its cost-effectiveness and its room
to account for local contexts – social and cultural aspects of communication
(Anderson and Feder, 2004).
The role of social learning in networks inspires the DFs’ approach. A body
of literature exists on the process of social network formation and underlying
incentives (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga-González,
2006; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Santos and Barrett, 2010). Equally, the role
of social networks in technology diffusion has been extensively documented
in empirical studies.1 Recent efforts studying network effects on technology
adoption have focused on documenting the existence of automatic and passive
social learning from a few starting points (seed nodes) to the larger target
population using careful empirical strategies.2 However, our understanding
of how this actually happens is limited. Existing studies have largely taken
networks as exogenous and do not address how existing networks respond to
interventions, like training of a random node in the network (Breza, 2015).
As a result, most studies do not indicate the underlying mechanisms through
which information and technology dissemination takes place within social
networks. Furthermore, the emphasis in the literature is often on settings in
which seed nodes’ effort to communicate to their neighbours about a new
technology is voluntary. Social learning may be suboptimal, suggesting that
training alone to DFs might not optimally influence knowledge and adoption
decision of peers (Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017; BenYishay and Mobarak,
2018). The relevant question from a policy perspective is then whether we can
leverage social learning within networks to nudge optimal information sharing
and adoption behaviour. Particularly, the role and nature of incentives in the
dissemination of information and behaviour in social networks are not well
understood. What type of incentives facilitates social learning in networks and
ultimately improves new technology adoption is still an active area of enquiry.
This paper studies whether social learning and adoption of a new technology
can be improved by providing incentives to DFs as injection points. A novel
contribution is the analysis of impacts of different incentive schemes for
prosocial tasks on DFs’ and other farmers’ networks, knowledge and adoption.
A randomised controlled trial (RCT) is conducted in which we compare
conventional training of representative farmers to incentivised training across
126 villages in northern Uganda. A random sample of households – the DFs – is
invited to receive training on growing of new drought-tolerant maize varieties
1 Early contributions to the literature on social learning and technology adoption include Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 1998)); Banerjee (1992); Ellison and Fudenberg (1993); Besley
and Case (1994); Foster and Rosenzweig (1995); Bala and Goyal (1998); Udry and Conley (2001);
Munshi (2004); Acemoglu et al. (2011).
2 See, for example, Kim et al. (2015) and Chami et al. (2018) for health-improving technologies;
Cai, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2015) for insurance products; and Kondylis, Mueller and Zhu (2017)
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(DTMVs), which are increasingly seen as important interventions that can help
boost yields, while reducing downside risk associated with droughts (Wossen
et al., 2017). A random subsample of the DFs then receives incentives to
encourage them to expend effort to share information with their co-villagers.
The experiment varies whether DFs receive a private material reward (PR) or
social recognition (SR) for their effort to share the knowledge learnt.
Theoretically, several reasons can motivate why the effect of social networks
on adoption of a new technology may be mediated by incentives. When a task
is prosocial, meaning that its benefits are enjoyed by those other than the DFs
themselves, incentives may encourage efforts to reach out to more co-villagers
with information about a new technology (Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack, 2014).
Incentives may, therefore, increase the DF’s degree – the number of people with
whom information about a technology is discussed. Furthermore, incentives
may induce DFs to experiment with and adopt the new technology themselves,
producing a demonstration effect (BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018). Several
studies have shown increased propensity of a neighbour to adopt a technology
when his or her network comprises adopters (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006;
Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and Patnam,
2013). In the presence of an adopter DF, social networks can influence adoption
decision of neighbours by sending information about the adoption decision of
the DF or through diffusion of knowledge (Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015).
Further, we examine the main mechanisms through which incentives’ effects
occur. Specifically, we endogenise networks and assess how incentives pro-
vided to DFs affect information networks as important conduits to new tech-
nology diffusion. Subsequently, we assess network effects on knowledge about
and adoption of DTMVs. We observe (i) whether a trained DF i is mentioned
among co-villager j′s contacts for crop production advice and (ii) the frequency
of interaction via the information exchange link. The former allows us to
measure network effects at the extensive margin, whereas the latter captures
the intensive margin. We then test whether social networks diffuse knowledge
about DTMVs or transfer adoption decisions of DFs to co-villagers. Such
understanding is important to identify strategies for nudging adoption of
optimal behaviour and designing incentives for better communication within
networks, with direct implication for the design of agricultural extension
and training programs in developing countries. Overall, we aim to answer
three main research questions: (i) Does providing incentives to DFs influence
their information networks and adoption behaviour? (ii) Does incentivised
training of DFs affect their co-villagers’ information networks, knowledge and
adoption of DTMVs? (iii) Do information networks in rural Uganda influence
technology adoption?
Our design has different distinctive aspects that sharpen the analysis of the
paper. The technology (i.e. DTMV) that we use in our experiment is a recently
introduced one, and people in the study communities have not formed their
own experiences, subjective opinions and beliefs about the technology that
might play a confounding role. This is corroborated by quite low adoption and
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We define the relevant social network as the farmers from whom the respondent
seeks advice on crop production. These informational networks are further
defined based on unidirectional links from DFs to the co-villagers, because
information is more likely to flow from the DFs rather than in the opposite
direction, especially since the technology is a new one and directly ‘injected’
into the DFs but not the co-villagers.
The main results of the paper are as follows. Incentives, both private material
rewards and SR, increase the knowledge of co-villagers about DTMVs and
change the networks of DFs and their co-villagers. However, evidence on the
effects of incentives on adoption behaviour is weak. SR increases the likeli-
hood of DFs’ growing DTMVs, while private material rewards increase co-
villagers’ adoption of the technology. Social networks significantly influence
co-villagers’ knowledge, at the extensive and intensive margins, suggesting
that networks do transfer information that confer better knowledge and under-
standing of DTMVs. However, controlling for endogeneity of social networks,
we do not find evidence that having an adopter DF within a co-villager’s
contacts for crop production advice significantly influences his or her adoption
decision.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on social networks in several
important ways. First, it explicitly shows how different types of incentives
influence knowledge and technology diffusion within social networks. Lack
of incentives may explain why direct training of DFs might not improve
knowledge and adoption behaviour of neighbours (Kondylis, Mueller, and
Zhu, 2017). One notable recent effort is BenYishay and Mobarak (2018), who
show that communicators’ own adoption and effort are susceptible to small
private incentives. However, BenYishay and Mobarak do not make a distinction
between private and social incentives.
Second, the paper contributes to the small but growing literature examining
how social networks change in response to an external stimulus. For example,
Vasilaky and Leonard (2018) matched female farmers in Uganda and encour-
aged them to exchange agricultural information. They observed continued
interaction between the matched pairs, which resulted in greater increases
in crop yields compared to conventional government extension. Feigenberg,
Field, and Pande (2013) randomised microfinance borrowers into either weekly
or monthly group meetings and showed that borrowers randomised into the
weekly group meetings continued interacting more even outside of group
meetings, suggesting persistent changes in the strength of ties through microfi-
nance. While these studies generally suggest that networks respond to external
stimulus, they provide evidence in very specific contexts, where prosocial
behaviour is limited. We provide evidence about how information networks
change in response to an agricultural extension intervention that provided direct
training to a random subset of seed nodes and in a setting where individuals are
expected to engage in a prosocial task to disseminate agricultural information
to their co-villagers.
Third, the paper also contributes to the literature studying the effects of social
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that a critical mass of adopters in a neighbour’s existing network – suggesting
passive learning – influences technology diffusion (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006;
Matuschke and Qaim, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; Krishnan and Patnam,
2013). We study the effect of having a directly trained and adopter DF in a
co-villager’s network for crop production advice on the likelihood of adopting
a technology. Moreover, previous literature does not distinguish between the
roles of the extensive and intensive margins in social networks.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
research context. Section 3 describes the experimental design and data collec-
tion. In Section 4, we examine the evidence for network change, improved
knowledge and adoption. We then examine potential mechanisms through
which the intervention may have affected outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
2. Context
The experiment was implemented in Nwoya district, northern Uganda, a
predominantly agrarian region characterised by low agricultural productivity.
The region’s poverty level is the highest in the country – about 44 per cent of
the population lives on less than one US dollar per day (Republic of Uganda,
2015). The region suffers from frequent weather shocks, including prolonged
dry spells and uncertainty about the onset and cessation of rainfall (Mwongera
et al., 2014). Damage to agricultural output due to weather shocks amounted
to more than 900 million US dollars in 2010, or 77 per cent of total damage
across all sectors of the country’s economy (Republic of Uganda, 2012, 2016).
Although households tend to engage in off-farm activities, such as weeding
neighbours’ plots, brick making and small businesses, diversification to non-
farm activities in rural parts of northern Uganda remains minimal due to limited
employment opportunities outside agriculture.
Efforts to sustain agricultural production in the region have focused on
promoting adoption of climate-smart agricultural (CSA) technologies. The
government of Uganda has identified CSA as an effective means of addressing
challenges related to weather shocks. However, farmers lack knowledge about
CSA technologies and perceive this as a major constraint to widespread
adoption (Shikuku et al., 2015). Current efforts to restructure the extension
system recognise the importance of working with DFs at the sub-county and
village level to enhance dissemination of improved technologies (Ministry of
Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries [MAAIF], 2016). Our study is part
of these efforts, and we focus on the performance of DFs who are more or less
‘representative’ of the target population.
3. Experimental Design and Data
3.1. Experimental design
We first generated a list of 310 sub-villages, from which we randomly selected
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was compiled for these selected sub-villages, and we randomly sampled 10
households from each sub-village. We then randomly picked one potential
DF from this subsample and organised a meeting with co-villagers to discuss
whether the thus selected candidate was ‘not too different’ (especially in
terms of wealth and landholdings) from the rest of the village and potentially
interested to experiment with new technologies. In more than 75 per cent of
the cases, the first candidate was selected as a DF. In the other villages, we
randomly picked another candidate and repeated the process. In one village,
we had to go through three iterations until we selected a candidate that was
endorsed by his or her co-villagers.
The 132 sub-villages were randomly assigned to one of three experimental
arms of 44 sub-villages each: (i) training only (‘conventional’ control), (ii)
training plus a private material reward (PR) and (iii) training plus SR.3 Target
farmers in the first experimental arm received training about DTMVs and were
subsequently asked to share the information with their co-villagers. Target
farmers in the second experimental arm received the same training but were
informed after the training they could earn a private reward (PR). They were
promised a weighing scale if they managed to share sufficient knowledge
with their peers – to be established during a surprise visit at some unknown
date in the future. They would earn the weighing scale in case the knowledge
score of one randomly sampled co-villager exceeded a threshold4. They were
told the reward was private, that the weighing scale was theirs to keep, and
that they were free to decide how to use it. Disseminating farmers in the
third experimental arm also received the training and were informed their
community would receive a weighing scale if they managed to share sufficient
knowledge with their peers – to be evaluated the same way as in the previous
treatment arm. We announced that, in case of sufficient knowledge diffusion,
there would be a public celebration during which the ‘good performance’ of
the DF was publicly announced, and the weighing scale would be handed over
to the village chief in the presence of other villagers.
Interventions were rolled-out in March 2016. We partnered with researchers
from the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) and Tillers
International – an NGO working with NARO to promote conservation farming
in Uganda. We provided a 3-day training session to the selected DFs. This
training lasted 5 hours per training day.
The trainings were organised in central locations, and DFs were invited to
travel to these sites. Training sessions were organised per sub-county, with
3 While a pure control group was not included because the prime objective was to study the impact
of private and social incentives as compared to the standard training approach in extension
systems, this has its own limitations. Impact estimates do not capture the full impacts of training
with private material rewards and training with social recognition on experimentation and
diffusion effort since the comparison group is not a pure control.
4 A weighing scale was worth UGX 60,000, equivalent to US$20. This was a valuable asset to rural
farmers in Uganda as among other purposes, they could use it to weigh farm produce before
selling to traders or other buyers hence reducing the likelihood of being cheated about quantity.
In total 19 farmers in the second experimental arm and 28 farmers in the third experimental arm
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11 farmers per session.5 In each sub-county, DFs from different treatment
arms were trained in separate venues to minimise contamination. The cost of
transport to the training venue and back was refunded, (USD 4, on average)
and tea and lunch were provided during the training. Of the 132 DFs who we
invited, 126 attended the full training.
3.2. Data and summary statistics
Data were collected during two household survey waves. A detailed baseline
survey was conducted between September and December 2015 covering 132
sub-villages. In every sub-village, the DF as well as nine randomly selected co-
villagers was interviewed. In total we visited 1320 households and collected
information on household demographics, crop and livestock production, off-
farm income, assets ownership, exposure to weather shocks, sources of agri-
cultural information, knowledge about farming practices and food security.
The second survey wave was conducted in February–May 2017. During the
follow-up survey, 126 sub-villages whose selected DFs had actually attended
the training were revisited. Effort was made to interview the same respondents
that had been interviewed at the baseline. In total, 1036 respondents (122 DFs
and 914 other farmers) were interviewed in the follow-up survey. Of the 914
co-villagers, 694 respondents were interviewed at both baseline and endline.
This shows that attrition is non-negligible, and we turn to addressing it below.
We administered a similar questionnaire to that used at baseline.
Panel A in Table 1 presents summary statistics of selected household
characteristics at baseline (2015) and endline (2017). Household heads were
predominantly male. On average, a household head was 45 years old and had
completed 6 years of formal education. The average household size was six.
The main source of livelihood for most households was farming. Households
cultivated on average one-half of a hectare under maize. Less than 3 per cent
of the sample households, both at baseline and endline, had access to formal
government extension.
In both survey waves, a specific module collected data on social networks (an
example of the social network modules is available in Appendix D). Previous
studies have defined social networks in different ways. For example, some
earlier studies defined social networks as comprising the entire village (e.g.
Besley and Case, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004). The
advantage of using the village as the relevant social network is that many of
a farmer’s contacts would be captured. The limitation, however, is that many
who are not in the farmer’s contacts are also included (Maertens and Barrett,
2012). Therefore, other studies have recently elicited farmer network links
directly (Maertens and Barrett, 2012; Krishnan and Patnam, 2013; Cai, de
Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015; Magnan et al., 2015). Respondents are asked about
5 A sub-county is the second administrative unit in Uganda, after the district. At the time of the
study, Nwoya district had four sub-counties including Anaka, Alero, Purongo and Koch Goma.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
2015 (baseline) 2017 (endline)
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Household characteristics
Sex of the household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.815 0.388 0.806 0.396
Age of the household head (years) 44.610 15.189 44.510 14.883
Household size (number of resident members) 5.789 2.374 6.346 2.623
Main activity of household head is farming
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.913 0.282 0.954 0.210
Education of household head (years) 5.621 3.360 5.593 3.390
Area of maize production (hectares) 0.451 0.883 0.477 0.757
Received credit (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.683 0.466 0.526 0.500
Own a radio (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.505 0.500 0.525 0.500
Own a phone (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.535 0.499 0.566 0.496
Received advice from government extension
(1 = yes, 0 = no)
0.025 0.157 0.010 0.099
Panel B: Social networks
Mentioned a DF as contact (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.014 0.119 0.159 0.366
Mentioned DF is an adopter (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.264
Frequency of interaction with DF (0 = no
interaction, 1 = rarely, 2 = at least monthly,
3 = daily)
0.023 0.216 0.352 0.889
Neighbour’s out-degree (size of information
network)
0.767 1.169 2.014 1.109
Risk-sharing network (1 = DF is a member) 0.073 0.260 0.098 0.298
Weak ties (1 = household has a second-order link) 0.004 0.066 0.050 0.217
Other information network (1 = DF is a member) 0.020 0.140 0.024 0.154
Panel C: Knowledge and adoption
Knowledge about DTMVs (score) 3.340 1.831 2.485 2.783
Adopt DTMV – Longe maize (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.122 0.327 0.165 0.371
Observations 905 905
the people with whom they interact for a specific purpose, such as information
exchange, risk sharing and friendship. Once each individual’s connections are
determined, links can be classified as unidirectional (i is in j’s network if j
claims i), bidirectional (i is in j’s network if j claims i or i claims j) or reciprocal
(i is in j’s network if j claims i and i claims j).
We elicit network links directly along several dimensions: names of indi-
viduals from whom the respondent gets advice about crop production, those
to whom the respondent gives advice about crop production, those from
whom the respondent gets advice about livestock production, those to whom
the respondent gives advice about livestock production, those from whom
the respondent would borrow money, those to whom the respondent would
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(e.g. kerosene and salt), those to whom the respondent would lend material
goods, those who visit the respondent’s home regularly, those whose homes
the respondent visits regularly, relatives in the village, nonrelatives with whom
the respondent socialises, those from whom the respondent receives medical
advice, those to whom the respondent would go if hit with a disaster, those
considered as neighbours and those with whom they belong to the same
farmers’ group.
We required the respondent to mention a fixed number of names (i.e. five
names) in a specific network type. The advantage of this approach is that it
helps respondents to understand what is required of them and to consider only
very relevant nodes of their specific network (Newman, 2010). The drawback
is that imposing a threshold limits the out-degree – the number of people
nominated by the respondent (Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015). Our pilot
study before the survey, however, showed that none of the respondents named
more than five people for all networks when the number was not limited.
Similar results were also observed at the baseline, with the average household
effectively consulting only another partner (Table 1).
In principle, we produce six types of household-level social network mea-
sures for our main analysis. The first measure is a dummy variable equal to one
if the household mentions a trained DF among its network of crop production
advice and zero if otherwise. The second social network variable is based on the
intensity of the link between households (Granovetter, 1973) and measures the
frequency of interaction of a household with the trained DFs through a bilateral
link. This measure ranges from 0 (no interaction at all between the neighbour
and a DF) to 3 (daily interaction with the DF). We use unidirectional links
because information is more likely to flow from the DF to the farmer claiming
him or her (Magnan et al., 2015). The third measure captures weak ties and
is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household is connected to the
DF for agricultural advice through second-order links and 0 if otherwise. A
second-order linked household is one that is named as a contact by a given
household’s neighbour if that neighbour is linked to the DF (Cai, de Janvry,
and Sadoulet, 2015).6 The fourth measure is the co-villager’s out-degree – a
structural characteristic of the social network defined as the number of listed
agricultural advice contacts for a household. We, however, acknowledge that
the training might have induced more discussions (and hence greater network
6 The relevant information-sharing networks are defined as farmers from whom the respondent
seeks advice on crop production, and further operationalised based on unidirectional links from
DFs to the co-villagers, because the technology is relatively new and we believe that relevant
information is more likely to flow from DFs (point of ‘injection’ for the new information) rather
than from co-villagers to DFs. Therefore, our measurement of networks does not confirm to the
standard and the full-spectrum definition of networks in the literature. We primarily focus on
‘strong ties’ because the information is relatively new and the time between the introduction
of the information and our measurement is relatively shorter for weak ties to play a key role
in diffusion of the new information. We do not claim that we mapped out the full network of
individuals. On the other hand, we recognise the non-trivial importance of weak ties in several
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size) as people might have become more curious to discuss topics covered in
the training, even with less intention of using the information immediately.
This would be true if people had contacted others to clarify some doubts and
questions following the training. The fifth social network variable is based
on membership to financial or risk-sharing neighbourhood. Two farmers –
the DF and the co-villager – belong to the same financial or risk-sharing
neighbourhood if they lend to, borrow from or exchange material goods in
common with each other at any point during the 2-year survey period. The
sixth variable captures non-crop production advice networks and is based on
co-membership of a DF and a co-villager to networks for medical or livestock
advice. Our main analysis relies on the first four measures, while we employ
the last two network measures for a sensitivity analysis. Baseline household
social network variables are reported in panel B of Table 1.
Panel C of Table 1 gives our main outcome variables. Knowledge is mea-
sured as a sum of correct responses on a 10-question knowledge exam. The
details of the questions are presented in the appendix. The questions included
general awareness of improved varieties, names of improved varieties of maize
and the benefits of growing improved varieties of maize. Questions included in
the knowledge exam allowed for multiple responses/choices. Farmers were free
to mention as many correct answers as they thought. All response categories
were considered in the calculation of the knowledge score. Each response
was, however, converted to a binary variable for inclusion in the calculation
of the knowledge score. All questions carried the same weight. However,
because DTMVs are adopted as a package of technologies, the training covered
additional aspects related to intercropping with beans and groundnuts, correct
sowing depth and spacing when intercropping and the number of seeds to be
planted in a hole. Adoption is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household grew
a DTMV on any of its farming plots between the baseline and the endline.
Only 1.4 per cent of the households mentioned a DF among its contacts
for agricultural advice at baseline compared to 15.9 per cent at endline. The
average out-degree for neighbours was 0.77 at baseline and 2.01 at endline.
Whereas there was no adopter DF at baseline, 7.5 per cent of the sample
households reported having an adopter DF in their contacts at endline. The
frequency of interaction between a mentioned DF and the neighbour was 0.33
points higher at endline compared to the baseline (0.02). Only 7 and 10 per
cent of the sample households mentioned a DF as a contact for risk sharing
at baseline and endline, respectively. The proportion of farmers connected via
second-order links to the DFs was only 0.4 per cent at baseline. This increased
to 5 per cent at endline. The proportion of farmers who are linked to the DFs
for information other than crop production advice was 2 per cent at baseline;
this number did not change much at endline.
3.3. Attrition, balance and spillovers
Unfortunately, attrition in our sample is considerable as outlined above. Six
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sub-villages representing 60 households or 4.5 per cent of the original total
sample dropped from the study. Attrition as a consequence of DFs not attending
training was not concentrated in a particular treatment arm. Because DFs were
only informed about the incentives (for those in the material reward and SR
groups) at the end of the training, attrition ought not to be related to treatment
assignment. Four more DFs (0.3 per cent of the total sample) were not available
for interviews during the endline survey: two had separated with their husbands
and we could not track them; one had migrated to the neighbouring Gulu town;
and another one had been hospitalised. These four DFs were not concentrated
in one experimental arm once again.
Finally, we were unable to administer the endline survey to some households
(220 households, or about 17 per cent of the original sample), as these
farmers were absent even after three callback visits. We have no particular
reason to believe that potential causes of attrition are systematically linked to
specific treatments (something that is confirmed by the data). Attrition rates
are rather equal across the three experimental arms. High attrition is potentially
problematic, as it could introduce selection bias in our randomised experiment.
We examine the implication of this attrition for our results in several ways.
First, we test whether our remaining sample is (still) balanced along key
observable dimensions – 18 variables in total. Using the ‘orth_out’ command
in STATA, pretreatment covariates are regressed on treatment dummies: an F-
test that all treatment arm coefficients equal zero failed to reject existence
of balance. In addition, we perform randomisation checks comparing each
treatment arm to the other. As presented in Table 2 (for a selection of the
variables), there was pretreatment balance across the randomly assigned groups
for all but three variables, namely, age and education of the household head
and household income. But, even for the three variables, differences are small:
education of the household head is 6.32 in the conventional control group and
5.80 in the private material reward group; age of the household is 44.79 in the
private material reward group and 42.30 in the SR group.
The second approach is to explain attrition with observable household
characteristics. Appendix Table A2 presents the results of a probit regres-
sion where we regress attrition status on the treatment dummies and house-
hold characteristics. As shown, treatment assignment is not correlated with
attrition. An F-test (p-value = 0.632) rejected the null hypothesis that the
treatment dummies jointly influenced attrition. Most of the other variables
are not correlated with our attrition dummy, while those that showed a sig-
nificant correlation were mostly not significantly different across our three
groups. Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that exter-
nal validity of the impact analysis might be compromised by non-random
attrition. For example, when attrition is based on unobservables like abil-
ity, we could perhaps systematically over- or underestimate the effect of
incentives.
As a third approach, therefore, we attempt to control for potential selection
concerns by a weighting procedure as a robustness analysis (Gerber and Green,
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first stage, a logit regression is used to estimate the predicted probability of
having non-missing measures for our outcomes given treatment assignment
and a vector of observable covariates (see Table 2). In the second stage, we
weight each observation using the inverse of the thus estimated probability of
having a non-missing measure of our outcomes. Our main results remain robust
to all these robustness tests.
Random assignment to treatment implies that identification is satisfied,
unless there are substantial spillover effects (so that the SUTVA is violated).
This might happen if DFs in the conventional training group changed their
behaviour as a result of knowing that others had been offered rewards. Yet,
spillover effects are shown to not pose a serious threat to our identification
effort. First, several design features help to minimise this risk: (i) we selected
only one DF from each sub-village, and hence there was only one treatment per
sub-village;7 (ii) DFs attended the training with others who were assigned to
the same experimental arm (even if this was not announced to the DFs before
the training); (iii) training sessions for different treatment arms were organised
at different venues; and (iv) sub-villages in northern Uganda, specifically in
Nwoya district, are geographically dispersed.
Second, we formally test for evidence of spillovers across neighbouring
sub-villages using Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates of the DFs.
We test whether the presence of a DF from another experimental arm in a
neighbouring sub-village affects information networks of the neighbour. Figure
B1 in the appendix (top panel) shows graphically the random assignment
of treatments, whereas the lower panel shows sub-villages receiving differ-
ent treatments but neighbouring each other. To check whether information
networks of the control group neighbours were affected by spillovers, we
compare information networks of control group neighbours who are close to
a treated neighbour and control group neighbours further away from treated
units. According to our estimates, summarised in Table A3 in the appendix,
there are no spillovers. Using a border-to-treatment dummy variable, a t-test
also indicates that control group neighbours’ information networks were not
significantly affected by the presence of a neighbour from another experimental
arm.
4. Results
4.1. Effects of incentives on adoption of DTMVs
Incentives can matter for agricultural technology diffusion for different rea-
sons. In Appendix E, we provide a simple theoretical framework to formally
organise these arguments. DFs may be motivated to communicate about the
new technology and experiment with the technology to achieve the critical
mass of peer farmers who know about the new technology to ensure getting the
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reward. Alternatively, neighbours, including those who were not in the DFs’
networks at the baseline, may realise that DFs become potentially important
nodes as a source of information about a highly relevant new technology in the
context of rural Uganda and actively seek to be connected with DFs.
We first estimate Equation (1) using the sample of DFs to assess the effect
of incentives on their decisions to grow DTMVs:
yivc = β0 + β1privateivc + β2socialivc + γiXivc + Cc + εivc (1)
where yivc indicates whether a DF i in sub-village v and sub-county c grew a
DTMV or not; privateivc and socialivc are dummy treatment variables: privateivc
is equal to 1 if the DF was randomly assigned to receive a private material
reward and 0 if otherwise and socialivc is equal to 1 if the DF was randomly
assigned to receive SR and 0 if otherwise. Xivc includes farmer and household
characteristics, and Cc captures sub-county fixed effects. Our selection of the
covariates Xivc was guided by literature on adoption analysis and the role
of incentives in technology diffusion (e.g. BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018).
Generally, the literature on adoption considers farmer and farm characteristics;
human, social and financial capital; and institutional factors as important
determinants of agricultural technology adoption. We estimate Equation (1)
using probit and report robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level.
The coefficients β1 and β2 in Equation (1) measure the causal effect of incentive
treatments on the DFs’ adoption decisions, under the identifying assumption
that privateivc and socialivc are orthogonal to εivc. Results in Table 3, columns 3
and 4, show that SR increased the likelihood of a DF adopting a DTMV by 14
percentage points relative to conventional training. The effect was significantly
larger than that of PRs (2.5 percentage points). That incentives affect adoption
decisions of DFs is consistent with the findings of BenYishay and Mobarak
(2018), who examined the responsiveness of DFs – selected using a criterion
similar to the one used in the current study – to incentives for technology diffu-
sion. These authors showed that material rewards motivate DFs to experiment
with new technologies. In our context, however, we distinguish between PRs
and SR and find that only the latter significantly influenced adoption decision
of DFs.
Next, we test incentive effects on knowledge and adoption of DTMVs by
DFs’ co-villagers (neighbours). Formally, we estimate Equation (1) using the
sample of co-villagers. In this estimation, yivc measures (i) knowledge scores
of co-villagers and (ii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if a co-villager i in sub-
village v and sub-county c grew a DTMV and 0 if otherwise. Results reported
in columns 5 and 6 indicate a significantly positive effect of SR on co-villagers’
knowledge. The effect of private material rewards on co-villagers’ knowledge
is significant, but only when we control for additional covariates (column 6).
Knowledge score increased 0.77 points higher for SR (p-value = 0.005) and
0.44 for private material rewards (p-value = 0.093). Without controlling for
additional covariates, the effect of both incentive types on adoption of DTMVs
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covariates, we find a 6.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of adopting
DTMVs for the private material rewards (p-value = 0.063).
Results in Table 3 need a special attention. PRs do not lead to DFs’ adoption.
But the effect estimates of PRs on neighbours’ knowledge and adoption are
shaky. They are weakly significant only when covariates are included in the
regression models. SR leads to adoption by DFs and knowledge by neighbours
(both precisely estimated) but no adoption by neighbours. One possible expla-
nation is that SR may motivate DFs to react more strongly to incentives. If
this is true, DFs in this treatment arm not only expend communication effort
but also adopt the technology themselves to produce a demonstration effect for
fellow villagers. Concurrently, our results show that DFs in the SR treatment
arm are more likely to adopt the new technology. An alternative explanation
is that the public good (the scale to be given for the village based on the
performance of the village DF) might have created incentives for neighbours to
learn about the technology (in order to get the scale that was to be shared with
everyone in the village) even if they did not use that knowledge immediately
through adoption, possibly because of the short time between training and
adoption.8 This suggests that incentivising farmers by offering a public good
would induce more interest for learning, and this provides relevant insight
to a wider literature on how to encourage learning. The implication is that
programs and policies would benefit more by taking into account other barriers
to agricultural technology adoption beyond incentives for knowledge transfer.
Having said this, we would like to warn readers that, though meaningfully
plausible, this later explanation remains speculative, since we do not have data
on the strategies DFs use to communicate the information to fellow villagers,
particularly how DFs communicate the incentive rewards to other farmers.
4.2. Identifying mechanisms for the effects of incentives
How do incentives operate? We hypothesise that incentives changed the social
networks of DFs and their co-villagers. Subsequently, and consistent with
previous studies, we identify two main channels through which social networks
may influence the adoption of a new technology: (i) co-villagers may gain
knowledge about the availability and benefits of the technology (e.g. Conley
and Udry, 2010), and (ii) people may be influenced by the decisions of others
(e.g. Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Matuschke and Qaim, 2009). We, therefore,
ask: (i) suppose that incentives change networks of trained DFs and the co-
villagers, and that (ii) DFs respond to incentives by adopting DTMVs, do
networks transfer adoption decision of the DFs or help to diffuse knowledge
or both?
To assess the effect of incentives on the social networks of the DFs, we
estimate Equation (1) where yivc now measures the DFs’ in-degree – the number
of neighbours with who the DF shared crop production advice. To test the effect
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of incentives on the networks of co-villagers, we causally estimate the intent-
to-treat (ITT) effects of a sub-village being assigned to incentivised DF training
(relative to conventional DF training) using Equation (2):
Networkivc = α0 + α1privateivc + α2socialivc + δiXivc + Cc + εivc (2)
where the outcomes of interest Networkivc in Equation (2) measure whether or
not a DF is mentioned in a neighbour’s contacts for crop production advice, the
frequency of interaction between a DF and his or her co-villagers and a weak
tie defined as an indirect link between a DF and a neighbour through another
co-villager. The rest of the variables are as defined in Equation (1).
Results in Table 4 show that both private material reward and SR increase
the likelihood of mentioning DFs as contacts for crop production advice (col.
2). Specifically, the probability of a neighbour mentioning a DF as a contact
for crop production advice increased by 8 percentage points more, for both
private material reward and SR, compared with conventional training of DFs.
The corresponding increase in the intensity of information exchange link was
0.67 points more for SR and 0.65 points more for private material rewards
(col. 3).9 Neither PRs nor SR significantly influenced formation of weak ties
(col. 4). Throughout, we find that the effect of PR and SR on networks is not
statistically different.
Next, we assess the influence of social networks on knowledge of co-
villagers, by estimating:
Knowledgeivc = θ0 + θ1Networkivc + ϑiXivc + Cc + εivc (3)
At the extensive margin, Networkivc measures whether a DF is mentioned
among a co-villager’s contacts for crop production advice, whereas at the
intensive margin, the variable measures the frequent interaction of co-villagers
with DFs. To control for endogeneity of Networkivc, we exploit the exogenous
variation generated by the random assignment of incentive treatments to
9 The relati onship between village chiefs and DFs may affect DFs’ incentives to share information
about DTMVs as the weight scales are given to the village chiefs. Our criteria for selecting the
DFs excluded village chiefs. We also avoided selecting DFs who were kins with the village chief.
We cannot, however, rule out completely that the selected DFs may still have some other indirect
relationship with village chiefs. In that case, there may be an incentive effect other than social
recognition in the SR group if DFs expect that they would finally get the scale once we hand it
over to the village chief. We went back to the field in May 2018 to collect additional data on how
the weighing scales were being used. We found that in both groups, the weighing scales still
existed and were in a working condition. In the private arm, the DFs mostly used the weighing
scales for weighing their own produce (mainly maize), rarely allowing others to access it – in very
few cases, access was allowed to close relatives and neighbours. Whereas relatives did not pay,
neighbours were typically charged a small fee for using the scale. In the social recognition arm,
we found that the village chiefs were still in charge of keeping and maintaining the weighing
scales – ruling out the possibility that the weighing scale ended up with the DFs. Second, co-
villagers were allowed to access the weighing scale at no fee, but with strict instructions to
handle the scale with care. Finally, we found that there were a few other individuals – in both the
private and social recognition arms – who owned weighing scales. For these privately owned
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Table 4. Incentive effects on co-villagers’ social networks





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private reward (PR) 0.689∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.669∗∗ 0.008
(0.282) (0.044) (0.296) (0.021)
Social recognition (SR) 0.908∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.649∗∗ −0.002
(0.300) (0.047) (0.313) (0.023)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −2.066∗∗∗
(0.713)
Observations 123 694 694 694
R-squared 0.169 0.052 0.095
Control group mean 1.225 0.122 0.234 0.045
[1.050] [0.328] [0.718] [0.207]
p-value: PR = SR 0.752 0.978 0.946 0.580
Notes. Column 1 is OLS regression estimates; columns 2 and 4 are average marginal effects from probit regression;
column 3 is Poisson regression estimates. Dependent variables are as follows: column 1 measures number of co-
villagers mentioning a DF as contact for crop production advice; column 2 is a binary variable equal to 1 if a
DF is mentioned among the co-villager’s contacts for crop production advice, 0 if otherwise; column 3 measures
the frequency of interaction between a neighbour and the mentioned DF; column 4 is a binary variable equal to
1 if a DF is not linked to the neighbour directly for crop production advice but through another co-villager, 0 if
otherwise. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the
standard deviations for the control group. Control group comprises households in sub-villages in which a DF was not
incentivised. Baseline household controls include sex, age and education of household head; agriculture as the main
source of livelihood of the household head; size of land cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts;





estimate an instrumental variable regression. OLS and IV estimation results
are reported in Table 5, columns 1 and 2. They show that social networks
improved the knowledge scores of co-villagers both at the extensive and
intensive margins. These results suggest that networks do transfer information
that confer better knowledge and understanding of DTMVs. The findings that
social networks increased knowledge of co-villagers are consistent with those
found in literature (e.g. Vasilaky and Leonard, 2018).
Throughout, the effects of the intensive margin are generally found to be
smaller than the extensive margin. This is a bit contrary to our expectation. Our
measure of intensive margin captures whether the DFs and their co-villagers
never interacted or interacted daily, at least weekly, at least monthly or less
often. First – with a caveat that the current study cannot definitively explain
this effect – we speculate that if neighbours who interacted with their DFs at
the extensive margin discussed for longer hours within one visit, it is plausible
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Table 5. Effect of information networks on co-villagers’ knowledge
Extensive Intensive
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mentioned DF as contact
for advice
2.200∗∗∗ 7.208∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 2.620∗∗
(0.280) (3.713) (0.111) (1.308)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.796∗∗∗ 1.342 1.898 1.674
(0.592) (0.783) (0.601) (0.713)
R-squared 0.280 0.367 0.262 0.407
Observations 694 694 694 694
Notes. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Extensive (columns 1 and 2) indicates
that an adopter DF is mentioned in the neighbour’s network, whereas Intensive (columns 3 and 4) indicates the
frequency of interaction with an adopter DF. Baseline household controls include sex, age and education of household
head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the household head; size of land cultivated with maize; size of
land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle and solar panel; access to information from a neighbour




several period of discussion at the intensive margin. Second, while our network
questions about the frequency of interactions were very specific and clearly
intended to reflect only information about crop production, social networks
in developing countries are multitasked so that (some) interactions might also
capture other aspects. Future research can benefit from explicitly addressing
these caveats.
In order to test whether social networks transfer adoption decisions of the
DFs, we estimate Equation (4) via instrumental variable approach using the
randomised incentive treatments as instruments:
Adoptivc = ϕ0 + ϕ1DFadoptivc + ρiXivc + Cc + εivc (4)
where Adoptivc is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a co-villager grew a DTMV
and 0 if otherwise. DFadoptivc measures whether a co-villager has an adopter
DF in his or her contacts for crop advice. Results are presented in Table 6.
Average marginal effects from probit regression (col. 1) show that having an
adopter DF in a co-villager’s network increased the likelihood of him or her
growing a DTMV. This correlation, however, disappears when we control for
endogeneity using IV approach (col. 2).
4.3. Robustness checks
To bolster further confidence in our incentives and network effects, we perform
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Table 6. Networks and co-villagers’ adoption decisions
Probit IV
(1) (2)




Household controls Yes Yes





Notes. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Baseline household controls include
sex, age and education of household head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the household head; size
of land cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle and solar panel;
access to information from a neighbour and friend; and agricultural assets index.
∗p < 0.01.
Table 7. Placebo test for spurious incentive effects
Explanatory variables Knowledge Adopt DTMV DF as contact
(1) (2) (3)
Private reward (PR) 0.294 0.030 0.006
(0.182) (0.033) (0.012)
Social recognition (SR) 0.099 0.006 0.014
(0.175) (0.029) (0.016)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.246 0.142 0.030
Observations 694 694 694
Notes. Columns 1 and 3 report OLS estimates. Column 2 reports average marginal effects from probit regression. In
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Baseline household controls include sex, age
and education of household head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the household head; size of land
cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle and solar panel; access to
information from a neighbour and friend; and agricultural assets index.
networks and adoption decisions – revealed before training of DFs – on the
(1) incentive treatment dummies and (ii) co-villagers’ baseline knowledge on
information network variable at endline. If the coefficients on the incentive
treatment dummies or information network variable are significantly positive
(or negative), it would indicate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
which could introduce bias (see also Magnan et al., 2015 for a similar
approach). Results in Table 7 indicate no statistically significant effect of
incentive knowledge, adoption and social networks of co-villagers before DFs
were trained, suggesting that our estimates are not affected by such a bias.
Similarly, results in Table 8 show no significant network effects on baseline
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Table 8. Placebo test for spurious network effects
Co-villager’s knowledge Co-villager’s adoption
(1) (2)
Mentioned DF as contact for advice 2.281
(1.992)
Adopter DF in co-villager’s network
for crop production advice
0.475
(1.009)
Household controls Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes
R-squared 0.798 0.123
Observations 694 694
Notes. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Baseline household controls include
sex, age and education of household head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the household head; size
of land cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle and solar panel;
access to information from a neighbour and friend; and agricultural assets index.
In addition to the placebo tests, we test whether co-membership of adopter
DFs and co-villagers in networks other than the crop production advice
affects adoption decisions of neighbours. Two additional network variables
are constructed. The first variable is based on membership to financial or risk-
sharing neighbourhood. Two farmers – the DF and the neighbour – belong to
the same financial or risk-sharing neighbourhood if they lend to, borrow from
or exchange material goods in common with each other at any point during the
2-year survey period. The second variable captures non-crop production advice
networks and is based on co-membership of a DF and a neighbour to networks
for medical or livestock advice. Our focus on these two additional network
variables is motivated by alternative explanations that would suggest that a
significant effect of agricultural advice network on uptake might be caused
by omitted variable bias because of information that neighbours share from
common access to other arrangements (Conley and Udry, 2010). As shown in
Table 9, we do not find significant effects of alternative networks on adoption of
DTMVs, and hence ruling out that neighbours may have changed their adoption
decision because they shared membership to other arrangements with DFs.
Alternatively, it is known that communication effectiveness critically
depends on the proximity or similarity of the source of information and its
recipient. As such, the social distance between DFs and their co-villagers is
likely to matter for the credibility and relevance of the information being shared
and hence for adoption behaviour. Farmers who receive information update
their beliefs about the technology under their own conditions. Usually, it is
expected that farmers would obtain more precise information when the DF is
more proximate to them. However, evidence on social distance as a determinant
of information exchange and adoption behaviour in agricultural settings is scant
(Munshi, 2004; BenYishay and Mobarak, 2018). Here, we present heteroge-
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Table 9. Effects of alternative networks on co-villagers’ adoption decision
Co-villager’s adoption
(1)
Adopter DF in risk-sharing network 0.103
(0.105)






Notes. OLS estimates. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Baseline household
controls include sex, age and education of household head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the
household head; size of land cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle
and solar panel; access to information from a neighbour and friend; and agricultural assets index.
Recently, Santos and Barrett (2010) and Shikuku (2019) provide some
guidance on a potentially useful measurement of social distance. The following
steps were followed in constructing the social distance variables. In step 1,
dyadic pairs were generated for each of the respondent interviewed at baseline.
Step 2 involved computing (for each dyadic pair) the absolute difference in the
continuous variable (education, age, agricultural assets endowment and non-
agricultural assets endowment). In step 3, the median village distance was
obtained for each variable. Step 4 then calculated the distance between the
village median and the absolute difference (for each variable) between the
DF and the neighbour. Social distance between DF i and neighbour j was
measured for gender types by a set of dummy variables that consider the several
possible characterisations of the match (Santos and Barrett, 2010). Results of
heterogeneous effects of incentives by social distance are presented in Table 10.
As shown in Table 10, the positive effect of incentives on knowledge
scores and social networks was higher when the DF was female and the co-
villager was male. A larger distance between the DF and the co-villager in
agricultural asset endowment and education relative to the village median
increased the likelihood of information exchange links, but did not improve
the knowledge scores of co-villagers. This may indicate that although co-
villagers were receptive of the messages of the DFs, it is possible that such
messages were not viewed as relevant to their own decision-making. This
finding, therefore, supports Bandiera and Rasul (2006).
Finally, robustness analysis of the effect of incentives on knowledge, adop-
tion and networks was performed using an inverse probability score weighting
procedure to formally assess the sensitivity of the main results to the attrition
problem as described in Section III. Results are presented in Table 11. As
shown, the attrition-weighted estimates remain robust and are similar to those
reported in Tables 3 and 4, suggesting the robustness of our results to the level






/erae/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/erae/jbaa009/5822695 by guest on 20 April 2020
Networks, incentives and technology adoption 23
Table 10. Heterogeneous effects of incentives by social distance









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private reward (PR) −0.077 0.046 0.054 0.030
(0.465) (0.072) (0.065) (0.157)
Social recognition (SR) 0.541 0.023 0.025 0.051
(0.524) (0.069) (0.077) (0.191)
Female DF_female co-villager −0.553 −0.042 0.004 −0.037
(0.451) (0.060) (0.059) (0.135)
Female DF_male co-villager −0.546 0.014 0.044 −0.053
(0.527) (0.064) (0.061) (0.129)
Distance in education 0.065 0.002 −0.002 −0.014
(0.105) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021)
Distance in agricultural assets
endowment
−0.053 −0.016 0.143∗∗ 0.369∗∗
(0.572) (0.086) (0.113) (0.161)
Private∗ female DF_female
co-villager
0.456 −0.046 0.006 0.230
(0.568) (0.093) (0.106) (0.287)
Private∗ female DF_male co-villager 1.744∗∗∗ 0.086 0.100 0.444∗
(0.635) (0.086) (0.103) (0.260)
Private∗ distance in education −0.038 −0.005 0.027 0.067∗
(0.134) (0.019) (0.016) (0.035)
Private∗ distance in agricultural assets
endowment
0.143 0.041 −0.157 −0.331
(0.741) (0.107) (0.097) (0.240)
Social∗ female DF_female co-villager 0.900 0.098 0.143 0.482
(0.591) (0.077) (0.113) (0.324)
Social∗ female DF_male co-villager 1.960∗∗∗ 0.064 0.216∗∗ 0.534∗∗
(0.629) (0.075) (0.095) (0.229)
Social∗ distance in education −0.168 −0.071 0.001 0.002
(0.145) (0.121) (0.018) (0.045)
Social∗ distance in agricultural assets
endowment
−0.358 −0.012 −0.045 −0.144
(0.789) (0.063) (0.109) (0.274)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.918∗∗∗ — 0.022 −0.040
(0.726) (0.094) (0.229)
R-squared 0.230 0.139 0.086 0.091
Observations 694 694 694 694
Notes. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. Columns 1, 3 and 4 are OLS
estimates. Column 2 is average marginal effects from probit regression. Baseline household controls include sex,
age and education of household head; agriculture as the main source of livelihood of the household head; size of land
cultivated with maize; size of land cultivated with groundnuts; ownership of radio, bicycle and solar panel; access to




5. Conclusion and Discussion
The central role of social learning in the transmission of information and
behaviours has been convincingly demonstrated. In many developing coun-
tries, social learning in networks offers a unique opportunity to augment
national extension systems for new technology diffusion. This paper studies
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Private reward (PR) 0.450∗ 0.068∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.485) (0.038) (0.044)
Social recognition (SR) 0.735∗∗∗ 0.031 0.086∗
(0.267) (0.035) (0.045)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Sub-county fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.603∗∗ 0.035 0.046
(0.700) (0.100) (0.102)
Observations 694 694 694
R-squared 0.197 0.107 0.047
Control group mean 2.320 0.162 0.122
[2.672] [0.369] [0.328]
p-value: PR = SR 0.244 0.277 0.890
Notes. OLS regression estimates. The outcomes are as follows: in column 1 are knowledge scores, in column 2 is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if a co-villager adopted a drought-tolerant variety and 0 if otherwise and in column (3)
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if DF is mentioned among the co-villager’s contacts for agricultural advice, 0 if
otherwise. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the sub-village level. In square parentheses are the
standard deviations for the control group. Control group comprises households in sub-villages in which a DF was
not incentivised. Household controls include sex, age and education of household head, household size, size of land





maize varieties (DTMVs) in northern Uganda and mechanisms through which
effects occur. In our experiment, a random subsample of trained individuals
receives incentives for sharing the knowledge learnt with their neighbours. We
distinguish between private material reward and SR incentive schemes.
Incentives increase the likelihood of DFs to experiment with DTMVs, the
knowledge of co-villagers about DTMVs and the number of people with whom
DFs discussed about farming, suggesting a change in the networks of both
DFS and neighbours. Relative to conventional training, incentivised training
increased the likelihood of a neighbour mentioning a DF in his or her own
contacts for agricultural advice and the frequency of interaction with a DF
for information exchange, but not second-order linkages through friends of
neighbours. Having an adopter DF in a farmer’s own network further improved
knowledge transmission about the new technology. We also document weak
evidence on the effects of incentives on adoption behaviour of peer farmers.
The results are robust to several robustness checks and controlling for spillover
effects and the problem of attrition in our sample.
Our results generate several important implications for policy. Providing
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knowledge and adoption decision of neighbours owing to the lack of appro-
priate incentives to share knowledge (Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017).
Here, we demonstrate that incentives matter for technology diffusion within
social networks. Recently, BenYishay and Mobarak (2018) showed that PRs
influenced social learning. In addition to PRs, we find that SR by announcing
‘good’ performance of DFs in public plays an important role to substantially
improve social learning. Our findings demonstrate that PR and SR are equally
important in affecting information networks. Overall, the fact that incentives
matter and social transmission is not always automatic suggests that social
learning models can likely be enriched by incentives that govern whether (and
how) people experiment with new technologies and communicate about them
with their peers.
Finally, certain qualifications warrant duly consideration in interpreting
our results. First, using incentives to harness social learning may produce
unexpected consequences. For example, it is possible that provision of pri-
vate incentives could undermine the credibility of DFs as communicators.
Peer farmers could become less interested in DFs’ advice about the positive
attributes of the new technology once they realise that the DFs are being paid
an incentive to deliver that information. In our context, this would be less of
a concern with the SR incentive scheme. Second, our incentives are based on
knowledge, but actual adoption may matter more than knowledge for policy,
as knowledge about a technology is an intermediate outcome. Our decision to
base incentives on knowledge was because, while DFs can hold meetings or
move from house to house to train the neighbours, the decision by neighbours
to actually adopt or not might be beyond the DFs’ effort. Furthermore, whether
DFs actually receive the incentive was assessed based on knowledge of a
randomly selected fellow villager. We acknowledge that this might introduce
some level of noise to the expected incentive for DFs and affect their efforts to
spread information. Third, we do not have information on the strategies DFs
used to communicate the information and specifically what they told other
farmers about the potential rewards. However, this concern can affect results
on both directions. For example, it is possible that the DFs communicate co-
villagers that the reward (weighting scale) can be used as a public good (even
in the private arms). On the other hand, it is also possible that provision of
incentives (especially private ones) could undermine the credibility of DFs
as communicators. We, therefore, acknowledge that in both the SR and the
PR treatment, it is possible that DFs told other farmers about the potential
for getting access to a scale. If so, both the SR and PR treatments may
have also had an incentivising or disincentivising effect on other farmers (in
addition to the DF). Fourth, although efforts were made to minimise strategic
interactions by DFs, we are unable to rule out completely that DFs may have
targeted only those co-villagers who were visited for the baseline survey. Fifth,
although our pilot study showed that none of the respondents mentioned more
than five contacts for agricultural advice, it is still possible that DFs shared
information about DTMVs, but their names were not mentioned among the top
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and knowledge exposure about the technology, try-out of the technology and
continued use – sometimes with considerable time lags. We, therefore, interpret
our results broadly as early uptake and not adoption/diffusion as defined
in a strict sense. We, therefore, acknowledge that the short time between
introduction of the technology and our adoption measurement may partially
account for insignificant adoption reports. These are relevant considerations
for future research.
5. Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at ERAE online.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A1. Determinants of attrition: probit regression
Variable Coefficient Standard error p-value
Private material reward (PR) 0.115 0.288 0.690
SR −0.163 0.250 0.514
Household head is male −0.476 0.220 0.030∗∗
Age of household head −0.002 0.006 0.736
Size of the household −0.058 0.045 0.192
Education of the household head 0.039 0.020 0.049∗∗
Household income (natural log) −0.064 0.104 0.538
Participation in casual employment −0.434 0.456 0.341
Participation in self-employment 0.299 0.532 0.575
Amount of credit received (natural log) −0.091 0.085 0.285
Agricultural assets index 0.026 0.021 0.224
Non-agricultural assets index 0.025 0.027 0.363
Housing index −0.224 0.233 0.336
Crop production advice network −0.056 0.082 0.497
Kinship network 0.010 0.074 0.891
Experience with floods −0.318 0.186 0.088∗
Experience with droughts 0.601 0.417 0.150
Constant 0.148 0.694 0.832
p-value of test: PR + SR = 0 0.632






Table A2. Test for spillover effects: t-test using a border-to-treatment dummy variable
Without potential spillover With potential spillover p-value of difference in
means
DF is mentioned 0.092 0.088 0.773
(0.011) (0.009)
[0.288] [0.283]
Frequency of interaction 0.179 0.205 0.417
(0.023) (0.023)
[0.634] [0.710]
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Per cent of land under maize 10.26 12.12 10.43 10.26 0.453 0.311 0.240 0.915
Yield of maize (kg/ha) 709.54 767.92 630.24 731.07 0.347 0.184 0.756 0.326
Per capita maize income (US$) 28.00 45.03 13.48 25.60 0.177 0.127 0.399 0.271
1286 428 431 427














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Per cent of land under maize 12.28 13.64 13.32 10.08 0.460 0.932 0.280 0.33
Yield of maize (kg/ha) 851.28 990.11 694.35 875.12 0.488 0.253 0.672 0.443
Per capita maize income (US$) 22.54 32.64 18.04 17.68 0.633 0.413 0.352 0.977
120 38 40 42














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Per cent of land under maize 10.78 11.97 10.13 10.28 0.481 0.289 0.300 0.926
Yield of maize (kg/ha) 694.95 746.27 623.68 715.34 0.456 0.246 0.794 0.389
Per capita maize income (US$) 28.57 46.24 13.01 26.46 0.190 0.141 0.433 0.269
1166 390 391 385
Table A6. Differences in maize importance and preferences between DFs and co-villagers:
t-tests
Co-villagers DFs Difference t-statistic
(3) = (4)
(1) (2) (3) (8)
Per cent of land under maize 11.21 12.28 −1.07 −0.714
Yield of maize (kg/ha) 699.50 851.28 −151.78 −1.399
Per capita maize income (US$) 33.01 22.54 10.46 1.131
1026 1026 1026
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Household head is male 0.87 0.82 0.88 0.770 0.600 0.868 0.481
Household head has primary level education 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.967 0.810 0.965 0.840
Age of household head 44.11 44.03 41.88 0.620 0.975 0.386 0.413
Household size 6.08 6.68 6.17 0.390 0.201 0.847 0.279
Area under maize 0.34 0.43 0.56 0.073 0.417 0.023 0.229
Dependency ratio 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.372 0.233 0.995 0.216
Participation in farmer group 0.79 0.88 0.71 0.184 0.320 0.442 0.072
Access to credit 0.71 0.68 0.79 0.508 0.738 0.447 0.265
Friendship network 1.71 2.03 1.91 0.392 0.177 0.418 0.614
Kinship network 2.05 1.63 1.74 0.224 0.088 0.210 0.589
Observations 38 40 42
Table A8. Differences in characteristics between disseminating farmers and their
co-villagers
Co-villagers DFs Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household head is male 0.82 0.86 −0.04 0.254
Household head has primary
level education
0.42 0.54 −0.12 0.012
Age of household head 43.68 43.3 0.38 0.747
Household size 5.80 6.31 −0.51 0.015
Area under maize 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.840
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.914
Participation in farmer group 0.80 0.79 0.01 0.880
Access to credit 0.68 0.73 −0.04 0.328
Friendship network 2.03 1.88 0.14 0.160
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Appendix B
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Appendix C: Questions for Testing Knowledge
(1) Have you ever heard about improved varieties of maize? (1 mark)
(2) What varieties have you heard about?
1 mark if farmer mentions Longe 10H.
1 mark if farmer mentions Longe 7.
1 mark if farmer mentions Longe 5.
1 mark if farmer mentions any other Longe maize.
(3) What are the benefits of growing improved varieties of maize?
1 mark if farmer mentions drought-tolerance.
1 mark if farmer mentions disease-resistance.
1 mark if farmer mentions pest-resistance.
1 mark if farmer mentions high-yielding.
1 mark if farmer mentions early maturing
Appendix D: Example of Social Networks Questions



















2 = at least weekly
3 = less often



















2 = at least weekly
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Appendix E: Theoretical Model
To guide our empirical analysis, we summarise a theoretical framework that
combines insights from the standard target input model commonly used in diffusion
studies (e.g. Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006) and a model of
incentives for communication proposed by BenYishay and Mobarak (2018). The
basic setup of the model is as follows. There is a continuum of farmers distributed
on a line, with mean revenues equal to 0 and variance equal to 1. Farmers can
produce output using a conventional technology, earning a certain level of profit
q, or a new technology. While the basics of the new technology are observable
and known to all farmers, we consider that one parameter is random and ex ante
unknown. This parameter is the target level of a variable input (say labour), denoted
by y∗.10 Payoffs of the new technology for farmer i depend on the distance between
the applied input level and the target: Qi = 1–(yi–y∗)2. For simplicity we assume
both the target value and productivity of the new technology are homogenous
across farmers. Nevertheless, payoffs may depend on the location of farmers in
the distribution. The reason is that farmers receive signals about the profitability
and implementation of the new technology by observing their peers, but the signal
of ‘neighbouring farmers’ is more informative than signals received from farmers
further away in the distribution.
Assume there is an ex ante common belief about the target input level, which
is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2. If farmers adopt the new
technology, their expected payoff equals 1 − σ 2, i.e. in the absence of additional
information, farmers will choose not to adopt when q > 1 − σ 2. Next, assume there
is one informed farmer, the disseminating farmer, who knows the target level y∗.
This farmer is located at x in the distribution and can choose to send a signal with
precision ρ to her peers at a cost c(ρ). We assume these costs are increasing in the
precision of the signal such that c′(ρ) > 0 and c′′(ρ) > 0. Following BenYishay
and Mobarak (2018), we assume that if the disseminating farmer sends a signal,
farmer i receives a noisy message with the noise level increasing in the distance
between x and i:
sxi = y∗ +
| x − i |
ρ
(1)
After receiving signal sxi the receiving farmer uses Bayesian updating to update
















10 The original diffusion model developed by Bardhan and Udry (1999) and Bandiera and Rasul
(2006) assumes that the target level y∗ varies across farms (i.e. yi∗). This approach captures
differences in agronomic conditions between farms. However, since our data do not enable
quantification of ‘proximity’ (or similarity) between farmers, we ignore such heterogeneity in
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Farmers further away from the disseminating farmer receive a noisier signal;
their updated beliefs are more biased and variable than the updated beliefs of
farmers closer to the disseminating farmer. Since farmers will only adopt if their
expected payoffs of the new technology are higher than their profits under the
traditional technology, farmer i will adopt the new technology if the following
condition is satisfied:







While diffusion of the new technology in the absence of signal-sending by the
disseminating farmer only occurs if q < 1 − σ 2, the probability that adoption
occurs increases after receiving a signal. Since the variance of the target level is
decreasing in the distance between sending and receiving farmers (x–i), diffusion
is most likely to occur among farmers within the information network of the signal-
sending farmer (i.e. the DF). The variance is also decreasing in the precision of the
signal, so disseminating farmers willing to incur greater signalling costs will also
promote diffusion. The level of signal-sending chosen by the disseminating farmer
will vary with marginal benefits and costs of increasing the precision of the signal.
In the absence of any benefits, farmers will not invest in information diffusion and
choose ρ = 0. We distinguish between two reasons why disseminating farmers
may choose a precision level that is greater than 0 and incur positive signalling
costs.
First, altruistic disseminating farmers may invest in signalling to increase the
payoffs of their peers (e.g. Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack, 2014). Specifically, assume
farmer x internalises the payoffs of farmer i and knows that (i) adopting the
technology would be welfare-increasing for farmer i and (ii) that sending a signal
would convince that farmer to adopt the new technology. Farmer x’s full payoff
function reads as:
πx = Qx + β
[
Qi − q
] − c (ρ) (5)
where Qx are the own material payoffs for farmer x and β ≤ 1 is the parameter
used to weigh the payoffs of farmer i. For Qi–q > 0, an altruistic disseminating







)2 = c′ (ρ) . (6)
Importantly, altruistic disseminating farmers should not send a signal to their
peers if they believe the distance to others is ‘too large’ so that the resulting signal
for the receivers will be ‘too noisy’.11 Further, we have assumed that the new
technology is equally productive for all farmers (upon applying the same level of
11 Observe that this finding depends on the assumption that disseminating farmers discount the
future. Her neighbours, after receiving a precise signal about input use, may subsequently decide
to send a signal to their own neighbours (located further away from the injection point). This
would allow information about the new technology to gradually and accurately spread. We
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input y). However, if heterogeneity in production conditions – say due to agronomic
circumstances or farming skills – implies a range of payoffs from adoption (as
documented by Suri (2011)), then an altruistic disseminating farmer may decide
to not send a signal if he or she suspects a fraction of her peers will be worse off
after adoption, even if they choose the optimal target y∗. Altruistic disseminating
farmers should only work hard to diffuse knowledge if they believe the net payoffs
of the new technology are positive for their peers.
Second, disseminating farmers may invest in signalling to secure private payoffs
– either in the form of a private material reward (PR) or in the form of SR. Following
BenYishay and Mobarak (2018), assume the disseminating farmer receives a
reward PR (or SR) if a certain mass of peer farmers knows about the new technology
or adopts the new technology. From Equation (4), adoption will occur by the mass
of farmers i satisfying the following condition:
(x − i)2 ≤ ρ
2
1
1−q − 1σ 2
. (7)
Suppose the reward is given if a mass z of farmers adopts. To obtain the reward,
disseminating farmer x should send signal with precision ρ∗ such that condition (7)
is satisfied for all farmers located on the interval [x − 1/2z, x + 1/2z]. Of course, this
signal will only be sent if c(ρ∗)<PR (or if c(ρ∗) <SR).
This theoretical model implies a potential for changes in information networks
coming from two sources. First, DFs may be motivated to reach out to more
neighbours either to optimise their altruistic behaviour or to achieve the critical
mass of peer farmers who know about the new technology to secure getting the
reward. In the end, this leads to an increase in the number of people with whom the
DF shares information about the new technology. Second, providing training to DFs
exogenously makes them potentially important nodes as a source of information
about a highly relevant new technology in the context of rural Uganda. Neighbours,
including those who were not in the DFs’ networks at the baseline, may realise
this and actively seek to be connected with DFs, ultimately implying changes in
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